


Automatic Verification of Iterated Separating Conjunctions using Symbolic Execution

ETH zürich


Peter Müller, **Malte Schwerhoff** and Alexander J. Summers

21st July 2016, Toronto

Modular Static Verification of Concurrent Programs




Access Permissions (\approx Separation Logic)




exclusive
access permission
held by thread 1

Permission Transfer





Permission Transfer



Unbounded Data Structures

Unidirectional



specify via
recursive predicate


Multi-directional



Random Access





Unstructured



Unbounded Data Structures

Unidirectional




Multi-directional




Random Access



Unstructured



specify via
iterated separating
conjunction



Unbounded Data Structures



specify and **verify** via
iterated separating
conjunction


Multi-directional



Random Access



Unstructured



Parallel Array Replace

```
method replace(a: Int[], left, right, from, to: Int)
```

```
{  
  /* only recursive case shown */  
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2  
  
  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)  
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)  
  
  join t1  
  join t2  
}
```

Parallel Array Replace: Verification Challenges

```
method replace(a: Int[], left, right, from, to: Int)
  requires permission to a[left..right)
  ensures permission to a[left..right)
{
  /* only recursive case shown */
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2

  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

verification state
representation

Parallel Array Replace: Verification Challenges

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  join t1
  join t2
}
```

verification state
representation

lose permissions

Parallel Array Replace: Verification Challenges

```
method replace(a: Int[], left, right, from, to: Int)
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  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

verification state
representation

lose permissions

gain permissions

Smallfoot-style Symbolic Execution

```
gain permission to x.f, y.f
assume x.f == y.f

var z := x

fork t := modify_f(z)
join t

assert x.f == y.f
```

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



handled by
the verifier



handled by
an SMT solver

Representing Permissions as Heap Chunks

gain permission to $x.f$, $y.f$
assume $x.f == y.f$

var $z := x$

fork $t := \text{modify_f}(z)$
join t

assert $x.f == y.f$

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



↓
heap location

↘
symbolic
value

Representing Value Constraints

gain permission to $x.f$, $y.f$

assume $x.f == y.f$

var $z := x$

fork $t := \text{modify_f}(z)$

join t

assert $x.f == y.f$

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



$v = w$

$z = x$

Losing Permissions

```
gain permission to x.f, y.f  
assume x.f == y.f
```

```
var z := x
```

```
fork t := modify_f(z)  
join t
```

```
assert x.f == y.f
```

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



$v = w$

$z = x$

Gaining Permissions

```
gain permission to x.f, y.f  
assume x.f == y.f
```

```
var z := x
```

```
fork t := modify_f(z)  
join t
```

```
assert x.f == y.f
```

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



$V = W$

$Z = X$



Asserting Value Constraints

```
gain permission to x.f, y.f  
assume x.f == y.f
```

```
var z := x
```

```
fork t := modify_f(z)  
join t
```

```
assert x.f == y.f
```



SMT query:
is $u = w$ entailed?

symbolic verification state:

heap chunks

constraints



$v = w$

$z = x$





Representing ISCs as Quantified Heap Chunks

```
method replace(a, left, right, from, to)
  requires permission to a[left..right)
  ensures permission to a[left..right)
{
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2
  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

$\forall a_i \in a[l..r)$



ISCs: Partially Losing Permissions

```
method replace(a, left, right, from, to)
  requires permission to a[left..right]
  ensures permission to a[left..right]
{
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2
  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

$\forall a_i \in a[l..r]$



ISCs: Fully Losing Permissions

```
method replace(a, left, right, from, to)
  requires permission to a[left..right]
  ensures permission to a[left..right]
{
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2

  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

$\forall a_i \in a[l..r)$

a_i

ISCs: Gaining Permissions

```
method replace(a, left, right, from, to)
  requires permission to a[left..right]
  ensures permission to a[left..right]
{
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2

  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

$\forall a_i \in a[l..m)$



$\forall a_i \in a[m..r)$



ISCs: Losing Permissions Across Multiple Chunks

```
method replace(a, left, right, from, to)
  requires permission to a[left..right]
  ensures permission to a[left..right]
{
  var mid := left + (right - left) / 2

  fork t1 := replace(a, left, mid, from, to)
  fork t2 := replace(a, mid, right, from, to)

  join t1
  join t2
}
```

$\forall a_i \in a[l..m)$



$\forall a_i \in a[m..r)$




Supporting General Receiver Expressions

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

General Receiver Expressions: Challenge

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$




$\{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_m\}$

permission to $y.f$?

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

General Receiver Expressions: Challenge

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$




$\exists x \in S ::$
 $e(x) = y?$

$\{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_m\}$

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

General Receiver Expressions: Injectivity

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$



1. Require $e(x)$ to be **injective**


(naturally satisfied by e.g. **arrays** and **graphs**)

$\{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_m\}$

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

General Receiver Expressions: Inverse Functions

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$




1. Require $e(x)$ to be **injective**
2. Axiomatise **inverse function** $e^{-1}(x)$ to SMT solver

$\{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_m\}$

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

General Receiver Expressions: Efficient Solution

gain $\forall x \in S :: \text{permission to } e(x).f$



&
 $e^{-1}(r)$

permission to $y.f$?

$\{y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots, y_m\}$

lose $\forall y \in R :: \text{permission to } y.f$

Summary: Presented in this Talk


Representation of ISCs in the verification state

Manipulation thereof: gaining and losing permissions

$$\forall a_i \in a[l..r)$$



Injective receiver expressions to avoid existential queries



Overview: Additionally in our Paper

Fractional permissions: shared read access

Complex **permission expressions:** e.g. for handling non-injective receiver expressions

Integration of ISCs with recursive predicates

Heap-dependent abstraction functions and functional properties in general

SMT challenges: encoding higher-order functions and partial functions; controlling quantifier instantiations

Evaluation: challenging examples, incl. arrays and graphs

Implementation is Open Source

Implemented as part of the



Verification Infrastructure



Support for iterated separating conjunction won the
Distinguished User-Assistance Tool Feature Award
at VerifyThis@ETAPS'16

Implementation is Open Source

Implemented as part of the


The logo for VIPER, featuring a stylized blue snake head on the left, with the word "VIPER" in a bold, blue, sans-serif font to its right.

Verification Infrastructure




Demo

Automatic Verification of ISCs using Symbolic Execution



$\forall \gamma \in S$



<http://viper.ethz.ch>